Naturalism and the misrepresentation of consciousness

The following is an essay I wrote for the course Problem of Consciousness at Umeå University, fall 2020. Introduction In contemporary philosophy of mind, naturalism and functionalism are the dominant approaches and have been for the last fifty years or so. Naturalism is is often seen as the default position for which no argument is needed (Zahavi, 2010). For example, David Armstrong supports his Continue reading

Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke

Husserl persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness. You see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness. One is perhaps reminded of Bergson Continue reading